terrific thank you very much welcome to our seminar this afternoon on the EU and
NATO role in containing indo-pacific security risks uh and I'm really
delighted to welcome back our colleague from Curtin uh Professor Alexi murugiev
let me Begin by acknowledging the traditional custodians of the land on which way I gathered excuse me
language groups and pay my respects to their Elders past present and emerging
acknowledging that rmit can access business on on their unseated lands
um prior to the disruptions that we all know in 2021-22 we had a very active and
and uh lengthy association between ourselves here at the EU Center of
Excellence at rmit and the Strategic flashlight program at Curtin University
represented of course by by Professor muravio the disruptions of the last couple of
years I think have diminished uh the the program that we had and the opportunity to have an ongoing conversation about EU
NATO Russia uh and and indo-pacific concerns so it's with great pleasure
that we're able to resume that and look forward very much to hearing uh your remarks Alexi and to engaging in some
conversation about them so welcome back and over to you thank you very much good afternoon to
all of you and good afternoon to participants who are joining us online
um first of all I would like to also pay my respects to traditional custodians on
the lands that we meet and um acknowledge the the leadership of the
past present and emerging leaders I also would like to thank
Bruce and Irene for helping to facilitate this this presentation given
its timeliness uh and I'll speak more about this in a moment and as Bruce said you know we had
a very long-lasting relationship with with the Senate it's fantastic to start resuming activities which were
unfortunately disrupted by events associated with the global pandemic
um the conversation that I and and you know
I would like I would like to share some points with you and hopefully that would help to facilitate the discussion so
feel free to ask me any questions you like um but the conversation that I want to
lead today is not something that is relatively new I can certainly recall
something that um happened about five years ago
uh at the time when I attended the Shangri-La dialogue for those who are maybe not familiar with the Shangri-La
dialogue it's an annual security and defense event that is held in Singapore uh normally involved in
defense ministers Chiefs of uh general staff and and and key
leadership of all the in the Pacific Nations plus Europe Plus North and South
America with the focus on discussing uh security and strategic matters of of concern and challenge for the in the
Pacific last time I attended the dialogue as part of the Australian delegation was in
2019 just before we went into into lockdown and that at that time it was
very interesting to see the way how the European representatives were coming
around and talking about uh the importance of the in the Pacific for
Europe the importance of the in the Pacific for individual Nations and the war representations uh from Germany from
France um uh uh EU EU representative of uh or the
sorry the representative of the European commission for uh diplomacy and security
FS margarine who was predecessor to the current um head of this
organization spoke uh great deal about how um the in the Pacific is important to
the EU and and certainly there was a lot of practical discussions behind closed doors about how EU and its individual
members could contribute in a variety of ways to um
uh addressing security concerns something that was also discussed in
length and they were and not that they lost any relevance but obviously I'm
making reference to five years ago and something that would remain relevant now uh the situation in South China see and
that was obviously the major point of discussion uh over many years before the
the current war in in and over Ukraine crisis in Taiwan not as massive as as it
was highlighted last year and and again the EU was and and NATO were trying to
play active roles there especially uh around August following and then
um head of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei uh and
the Korean Peninsula and the Korean Peninsula dprk's nuclear missile program
um was one of the traditionally uh focal points of distributions when it came to
this uh considering matters concerning Security in the in the Pacific and the Europeans
who were effectively joining uh in in unison with its Regional Partners
including Australia expressing their concern on how North Korean regime was
behaving and how it may be affecting potential conflict on the Korean
Peninsula and overall strategic environment of Northeast Asia so that was five years ago after that
came covet with that that created a lot of Confusion And as of 24th of February
last year Europe has been obviously been fully preoccupied with dramatic
developments that occurred in in Ukraine due to Russia's
invasion of the country uh on on on that day
so let me let me just start with um considering couple of developments
that were occurring of the past week and that also explains why why this presentation today is is really timely
in the in the past 48 Hours um uh we've seen some official communique
released as a result of the NATO Summit in Vilnius the capital of Lithuania that
was held from the 11th to the 12th of uh July so the the summit finished
yesterday so it's pretty hot of the news but on the first day of the summit NATO released the official communique
concerning the organization's current and future
stance and Views and perceptions uh on matters of strategic concern
uh the communique involves 90 points uh and I'm sharing this uh particular
point with you I'm I just cut and pasted admitting academic plagiarism here uh
but I'm also formally acknowledging that it was taken from NATO's Community Care that would be of direct relevance to
um uh to uh the topic of the of the discussion uh I'm not going to read it
out I I hope you can you can see it uh well as well as for those who are
joining us online um uh the Immunology is very interesting
uh having this declaratory uh Point uh the point about engagement with the
original partners for which I speak more uh in in due course linking it back to
the question of Ukraine because as one would appreciate Ukraine dominated the
summit strategic agenda and we'll continue to Preamble The the conversation later on we'll continue to
affect the way how Europe will um uh consider its future levels of
commitments to uh to the in the Pacific despite the fact that they haven't
really um uh uh rethought the the concerns that as
I was saying were expressed five years ago and and earlier than that uh the
question of cyber uh is something that is is also uh really really important
uh and obviously a reference to the international rules based order because this I'm drawing your attention to to a
couple of particulars because these are the ones that help to understand a joint
NATO and EU agenda with IV our our part of the world so this is something that
was released uh two days ago but before that last week and when I began
preparing for today's talk I I picked up on that news uh as well two more
developments that occurred uh on on the same day one
was something that would continue to shape up the Strategic environment of
our part of the world and that is associated with an expansion of the Shanghai cooperation organization
unfortunately I don't think we pay enough attention to its role in place in the context of the
in the Pacific strategic Affairs I'm sharing my personal views here on on this method because historically
Canberra continued to use or viewed the Shanghai cooperation organization as something more to do with Central Asia
and the form of Soviet space rather than with our part of the world however the the the the expansion of this
organization to include now Iran um and with uh previous
um inclusions of India Pakistan China as one of the co-founding members on part
with Russia uh a number of former Soviet Central Asian republics plus a number of
countries that act as observers to the organization makes this organization
more of the in the Pacific nature rather than uh Asia or Eurasia Centric nature
so uh that obviously something and the implications of Iran's inclusion in the
SEO are yet to be fully understood and appreciated but it's something that
obviously will have to be worked through and understood in the context of how we
here will now be perceiving uh this this particular development
because obviously we don't use we don't use SEO as something that aligns with
our Norms rules and and and values but we still they don't think figure out how
to position ourselves with that particular uh structure and
um on on the day when Iran was formally invited into SEO China made a very
interesting move by um effectively canceling the visit of the current High
representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security uh Jesse Burrell to
um Beijing it was to spend he was supposed to spend um sometime this week in in China
talking about Ukraine talking about the European concerns uh Israeli China and I
think that was perhaps this were two reasons why the Chinese decided to
um cancel the visit something that doesn't normally happen when when they
kind of go and bluntly say that you know things have changed we're no longer can accommodate you there
Etc so that was a very interesting move bearing in mind also that China did
receive some attention at NATO's Summit uh again
uh one can argue that well Burrell is not to represent Nate he represents the
Diplomatic and security win of the European Union and what's that to do with what NATO is discussing but as I
will point out later on uh there is obviously growing convergence between
EU and NATO structures with IV uh understanding and sharing views and
agendas on foreign policy security and defense policy matters so even if
technically there may be representative or one particular structure the way how this
representative will be perceived and received by by third party may not
necessarily be limited to that particular structure in this context the the EU so this work major developments
if we're thinking of Europe if we're thinking of our part of the world and and and again
um coming back to the admission of Iran Iran just like other
problem areas historically has been one of also points of concern for World
Europeans for Brussels whether we're thinking Brussels in the context of the EU or whether we're thinking of Brussels
in the context of of NATO so again this is something that in my view directly
relates to to the topic of the conversation so what are the major strategic concerns
that Europe has in our part of the world if because of before we can talk about
uh understanding on how NATO and EU can mitigate or contribute to medication
risks we need to understand what those risks are in the first instance I want to draw
your attention to um what I describe in very simplistic
terms EU strategy I call it EU strategy 2022 because there was a document or
plan on a page or strategy on a page that was released last year that helps to kind of summarize it's
obviously a public release document so it it has a collection of very broad
statements on on why the in the Pacific is important
to the European Union um um if you if you have a chance to to
Google it it's it's publicly available a simple read um looks really colorful and especially
if it's well printed uh but the synopsis of the document is EU uh use views on
the in the Pacific are shaped up and driven by uh long-term economic and I
put economic first uh and then geopolitical considerations and and concerns the document acknowledges that
40 of the EU trade trade travels through the in the Pacific and in this sense
um as a strategist I always Place geography at one of the core places of my analysis
when it comes to my my research or it comes what I teach to students
um and and and suddenly that document helps to understand that EU appreciates
strategic geography of the region really really well because it talks about the maritime setting it talks about critical
lines of communication sea lines of communications associate risk risks Associated to the
stability of of those lines um so in broader sense
EU invest so much in in trade with um the in the Pacific region
predominantly China but not to make other members of the in the Pacific Community less important and obviously
is concerned about sustainability of of of that trade not in the context of
whether there's going to be some sort of a trade war between uh EU and it's a in
the Pacific counterparts but what if that Global Supply Chain may be disrupted and as a result it would have
it would impinge on on the economic performance and the economic Outlook
um so subsequently to that given the fact that in the Pacific by virtue of its
geography is maritime and nature Maritime security becomes one of the killer uh sorry pillar uh discussion
points for for the EU strategy visibility in the Pacific and also that helps to explain how EU would probably
consider its huge commitments and back in 2019 again there was a lot of talk on
how EU could contribute to support and favorable Maritime Security regimes on how to upset challenging
threats to the in the Pacific that was particularly discussed in the context of South China Sea because South China Sea
historically been regarded as one of the um shock points uh to use specific
terminology meaning if something happens there it would have a Global Effect if
Maritime critical Maritime Lindsay lines of communications bypassing
across in South China she would be compromised the the shock effect from
such a development would be felt uh right across
the globe and and the second important point is addressing cyber crime there
was no specific reference to any any particular Nation with regards to cyber crime uh but it's something that EU
firmly placed on its agenda and again if you uh to just take you back for a
moment to the Village communique again a reference to
cyber defense uh by by NATO kind of occurs a little bit with uh with the EU
concern uh on on cyber crime and obviously natives now thinking cyber defense because of its current open
standoff with Russia over the crisis in uh in Ukraine
um so as far as EU is concerned uh the only
clear strategy that came out of it was a lot of discussion probably not as much as we have here because obviously after
Russia's invasion of Ukraine the U.S Focus was firmly on the developments in in Eastern Europe and and Eurasia uh but
it was very interesting to understand that um strategy that became obviously a
product of many years of discussions and deliberations about how Europe should
really be considered our part of the world but I want to take you back to communica that was released as I said
two days ago uh with a couple of points about how Native fields of our part of
the world as I said the communique comprises 90 points uh uh
or or or 90 90 paragraphs uh
about I would probably say five or six of which would be connected to the in
the Pacific strategic affairs this um three paragraphs in particular help
to understand what a NATO's major concerns when it comes to our part of
the world then is you can appreciate the majority of of the focus is on the
people People's Republic of China obviously a reference to China
has been done not in the same way how NATO was referring uh to Russia uh I I I
certainly can say the language that's been carefully chosen with IV China is
is is is more balanced but nonetheless
clearly outlines where he where NATO uh
expresses its concerns so there are concerns about what China's future
intentions are going to look like uh it's an acknowledgment that China is
Growing Power it's expanding its capability but it's not very clear what its future intent is going to be and
clearly this is something that is of concern to to the EU uh
uh in one of the later points which I didn't didn't formally acknowledge here
there is also a reference to China's nuclear weapons development program something that Nate also considers to be
a point of concern but here if if you look at the sub package points 23 and points 24 of the
Vilnius Community Care uh besides considering China as a standalone
strategic Factor potential uh spoiler uh
strategic spoiler because again as as you can see NATO is clearly concerned in
in us China to come out clean about what China wants to do what China intends to
do Etc um Brussels is become recognizing uh and
and Rose to the understanding that Russia and China have now entered the the the stage in
their relationship which I personally describe as near Alliance uh there are
different ways how different experts and and and governments refer to the current
state of Russia China relationships some refer to it the Strategic partnership this is how obviously Moscow and Beijing
refer to one another or enhanced deep and strategic partnership
uh some talk about some sort of collaboration Coalition I call it near
Alliance and I and I use this this term not lightly I
have uh carefully examined the state of Russia China or China Russian
cooperation particularly in the security and defense sphere the most sensitive areas that can highlight uh either the
the the the the level of limitations that may exist in in bilateral relationship between the two countries
or the level of uh and the extent of the integration and suddenly
uh whilst a lot of focus has been on on what the Chinese are buying from the
Russians and how the Russians become independent on China in terms of investment in terms of uh Alternative
Market after the Fallout of the tsunami of sanctions that Russia was hit with uh
certainly the level of cooperation that exists at the security and and the defense level there I think it's yet to
be fully appreciated and something that can only be found in established formal
relationships in established formal political military unions uh even though
the two countries stop short of effectively formally committing to one another while first of all China has
non-alignment policy even though it's not part of the non-alignment movement and I don't think Russia really wants to
kind of put Alex in one basket because obviously it would have impact on its relationship with other members of the
International Community including here in the in the Pacific but nonetheless the extent of of their relationship has
gone as far uh that it now started to land in the
trinal documents and the fact that Nita acknowledged it um in in in special Community Care really
suggests this is something that is would become another concern alongside of
crisis in Taiwan alongside of the Korean Peninsula alongside of South China Sea
and it was interesting oops sorry uh it was interesting to see that there was a
reference to the dprk and its nuclear missile program but it was almost done like yes we haven't forgotten about you
guys we're still very unhappy about what you're doing we call you to end of it but we're busy with other things so
we're not going to kind of you know dwell on developing our stand on the issue
uh what I also found really interesting that there was no reference to the South China Sea
if before South China Sea just like Taiwan would
be one of the commonly referred to matters uh that would come out of Brussels either Brussels as EU or
Brussels at headquarters of NATO this time the communique didn't really go
into such a fine detail yes they kind of really poke the Chinese and they poke them quite delicately and that's already
triggered a formal response from Beijing but maybe they decided we're not going
to push it too hard and too far uh so it's it's it's it's interesting to
know that maybe maybe I haven't looked into the communique in such a fine detail maybe there is a reference
somewhere but if it is it's well hidden and not something that that stands out
but for everything else uh um obviously it tipped all the boxes uh highlighting
ongoing concerns on something that was expressed five years ago before the war
in Ukraine and and earlier than that
um so what are the major considerations and again I'm not going to list them all I'll just highlight what I believe it's
important and again happy to take questions when it comes to Nato
it's a bit unusual to talk about NATO's involvement in our part of the world simply because
in in very simple terms and I'm not really sure how well you're familiar with the history of organization is but
very quickly it almost become part of the urban
legend that NATO was created because of the three key points to keep the American seen to keep the
Russians out to keep the Germans down so that was the initial mission of NATO when it was forged back in 1949 at the
height of the first escalation phase of the Cold War confrontation uh it's mandate is all about protecting
and defending the transatlantic connection that links North America uh
the United States to some extent Canada is a member of NATO with Europe and to
protect and defend Europe from a ray of threats during the Cold War the the key
strategic concern was the Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War NATO went through a period of rethinking it's
about its future identity its future missions uh it has some responsibility
in the Balkans even though it fell outside of its um mandate because at
that time the Balkans the former yoga slavia was not part of NATO and in theory under the existing framework NATO
cannot operate outside of um uh internationally recognized
boundaries of its member states but obviously being especially after the
disillusionment of the worship acts of it led uh Alliance which was formed in
1955 as a count of balance to Nate and then it was dissolved in 1989. NATO
struggled to think about um what its future is going to look like and whether it has the the the the the
role to play and whether there is a warrant for its existence so entertained a number of roles outside of its
traditional area of responsibility native participated in in a range of
activities focusing predominantly on Candor in a symmetric security challenges such as how much in Paris
here at the Gulf of um Aiden on the operation ocean Shield to
support the U.S led operations in Afghanistan part of operation
enduring freedom and countering the Taliban and the threat of al-Qaeda
battling or narca traffic across Asia as well as in in the baltics uh uh
participated the regime in the regime change in Libya when it interfered in in
the Libyan Civil War which saw the Austin of the regime of marmar Qaddafi in 2011.
um back in 1999 uh NATO was involved in supporting cost of a Liberation Army
after crisis in in Kosovo and attack Serbia operational light Force which was
also outside of its um area of mandate Etc but it was still areas more or less
of more or less close geographical proximity to Europe or where the European powers historically had
presence like North America North Africa for example or or parts of the Middle
East the in the Pacific was a bit kind of stretch of imagination even though after NATO committed to almost 20 years
of operations in Afghanistan which obviously geographically was the furthest
operation for the alliance um and sometimes history thinking about the
in the Pacific strategic Affairs hasn't become too much of a you know wild card in terms of drawing on imagination Plus
in simple terms any any type of bureaucracy including
defense bureaucracy has to justify its existence so for the military Alliance you need to search for a for a
substantial counter argument and at that time Russia was busy sorting out itself
it wasn't considered to be the threat to the European security so uh the rise in
China but at that time China was not con and now by that time I mean 1990s early 2000s China was not regarded as a
strategic challenge uh but crisis of Taiwan was was highlighted from mid
1990s so the Taiwan issue the South China Sea issue which became a problem
since 1980s and the Korean Peninsula were all something that NATO began
gradually interested in even though it struggled to understand how it can actually contribute to something well
outside of its area's responsibility when the problems lie literally lie in
the atmosphere or another part of the world um but suddenly
with adopting a more Global Outlook partially influenced by obviously the
United States and its leading role NATO began kind of repositioning and then reconfiguring
itself which also resulted in in the develop of development of special relationship with a number of key
Partners like-minded Nations part of the in the Pacific they are known as ip4
um that includes us that includes Japan that includes uh New Zealand and the
Republic of Korea these foreign nations are being considered to be uh close
partners of NATO they are not formally part of the alliance but they operate alone Samuel Alliance we fought
alongside native in Afghanistan we have contributed to counterpiracy operations
in the Gulf of Eden we had a lot of interaction with Native structures by
William in Australia for a very long time uh and obviously these also the
countries that share similar concerns and have similar views on major strategic concerns in the in the Pacific
of which I already spoke to about and it was quite symbolic but not surprising to
see Representatives heads of state of this ip4 countries in Vilnius where they
met they received warm reception they had their bilaterals they had their multilaterals there
um they spoke about a number of issues including Ukraine and now Ukraine has become another point of a unified action
all of these countries have contributed to the Ukrainian military aid they have
joined the sanctions regime against Russia uh and obviously they share concerns on China South China Sea and
dprk and and the list goes on so whilst NATO was was was trying to
figure out how to make itself present in the in the
Pacific one of uh one of ways how it began kind of anchoring itself is by way
of forging partnership with regional and with regional Partners which gave
speculation that we may be seeing and eventual emergence of so-called Asian
NATO or Asia Pacific or in the Pacific NATO something that suddenly was
actively discussed in Moscow as well as in uh in Beijing but there is also
another way how NATO or EU for that matter uh have anchored itself and
continue to end itself in the in the Pacific affairs we shouldn't be forgetting that the
number of European nations continue to have overseas possessions in our part of the world uh that obviously refers to
the UK even though UK pulled out of the EU but they very much in in the British
are very much involved in in NATO's Affairs as well as France so these are the two countries that
immediately come to mind when it comes to understanding of why certain nations would be pushing for the
for the more active involvement of Europe in the in the Pacific Affairs simply because they also hear yes in The
Limited capacity uh yes obviously not something that they can actually do in
terms of playing a role of a regional influencer uh but the foothold or
limited foothold of individual member states of EU and nato in our part of the
world kind of by default brings brings the two structures into into our
equation as well so a mix of retaining in the colonial Legacy and
retaining some physical presence as well as obtaining links via why partnership
Network kind of brings Europe more into our conversation
um but again it would have been a far must
try to answer if we would be having this discussion say even in early February
last year live alone same time in 2021 but given what's happening in in in
Eastern Europe right now obviously not a reference to the war in Ukraine
the bigger question is how far both the EU and NATO can go in terms of
extending their commitment Beyond declaratory statements and before the
ongoing verbal simply because in in in in the current situation uh
uh Brussels needs to make priorities again I'm making a reference to to the
Vilnius communicationally because it's really hot of the press so makes perfect sense
to analyze it with the magnifying glass uh and and a reference to there is an
interest in reference in NATO declaration to the EU in terms of understanding why am I talking about
them as a as a as a as a collective as a as a concert
uh and um uh it was also interesting to see that a
reference to to the PRC to China uh when Anita was talking about like-minded
approach and the need to obviously integrate and collaborate and consult
with uh with its colleagues in in in the EU so there is clearly similar agenda
that EU and NATO would have certainly when it comes to to to our part of the world I mean obviously they have simile
Legend Visa in Ukraine so certainly when it comes to understanding and sharing
security and defense concerns so that's obviously the prerogative for NATO uh
they seem to be on the same page again no surprises because many of members of the EU members uh of uh of NATO so it
would be really interesting to see if the same country would all of a sudden have uh two minds on on the same matters
when it comes to issues of National Security and defense uh prior to the war in Ukraine
um EU and NATO begin kind of identifying um Mutual points of of concern uh
some years ago I contributed to a book edited by Bruce and and and and his
colleague here at Almighty where I talk about the need for the Europeans and the Australians to formulate more common
agendas and I was kind of trying to work out what are the key and uh what are the
key features uh key strategic challenges for Europe and by Europe NATO and the EU
was at that time it was about four or five years ago I don't remember when when exactly it was huh
yeah 2018. so uh at the at the core of
of the agenda was a reference to the uh upholding International rules based
store there and as as you would see from the village declaration there is always this reference top holding values or a
challenge in values Etc that's a reference to International rules-based order so again this is this is something
I formulated back in 2018 uh the importance of strategic ties with
with the US and obviously that means that uh Brussels by Brussels I mean both
EU and Nathan have to adjust the Strategic agenda to
accommodate the thinking or at least reflect the thinking in Washington uh in a variety of ways and certainly for the
Europeans even back then back in 2018 Russia was number one strategic concern
yes they talk about China but not in the same way we talk about China here and certainly before the war in Ukraine when
I was meeting with my European counterparts um and we had a variety of
conversations we would be talking of China all the time they would be talking of Russia all the time and then we would
look with one another and try to work out why we maybe having same same
Outlook but we're talking about two different factors so at that time I was actually suggesting we need to stop
treating this took me and Nations uh
separately I was calling referring to them as the big two and we really need to kind of bring them together and and
create it a bit more coordinated Outlook something that native began reflection on when it they talked about the the
convergence between between the two Nations but the war in Ukraine the ongoing
conflict in Ukraine no one expected that it would last that long um would would obviously impinge a lot
about the actual capacity of Europe to commit anything to the in the Pacific
uh there was a lot of expectation uh that by now Ukraine would achieve
strategic success particularly after it showed great strides in liberating its
territory in the second half of last year so when Ukraine launched its much deep discussed and promised count
offense if everyone was kind of thinking well by now they should be on the outskirts of the Crimean Peninsula but
clearly it hasn't gone the way anyone have planned
and given the the stalemate in which Europe found it so when it cannot simply
let Ukraine go it it committed to support it all all the way it will
continue to support it all the way uh but that means that
the resources that is available to to even support in
Ukraine is really pushes the Europeans to to the point when then they're
talking about we can increase the production of artillery shelves or other types of Munitions uh bearing in mind
the war in 2024 2025 but not now so in this situation the question raises what
if there's going to be a dramatic escalation of tensions in the in the Pacific can native or will need despite
the fact that it's the world's largest um uh Alliance and now just expanded to
accommodate Finland and as Sweden is next in line be able to
offer similar degree of support and sustainability uh to candoring similar type of threats
in in the in in our part of the world the way how it it tries to support Kiev
right now and that remains uh a billion dollar question or probably a bit more than
that given the fact that NATO is is still having discussions about how far
the defense budget have to go um and and that raises a point that I
certainly want to kind of um uh highlight that despite all the talk NATO hasn't really or or Europe or
European nations haven't really done much more than that again the the
tyranny of geography is a is an obvious limitation but also is limited resources
uh when the UK deployed its career battle group in in 2021 to the in the
Pacific it receives so much hype and it was such an exciting development whilst
by and large it's not something that is can be considered to be a deal breaker uh next time the British promised to
bring the carrier into our part of the world is the year 2025.
so if the UK that has one of the world's most capable navies can only commit to
send a decent sizable Naval Force every four years at best well again coming
back to the question what if something will happen tomorrow what what can Europeans contribute if they now
scramble into uh send sufficient number of things to the ukrainians
so I think this is something that is probably on the minds of of policy
makers and and strategy planners and in Brussels and other European capitals and
that perhaps also explains why um uh both EU and and Native
declarations about the in the Pacific about China about even North North Korea
uh um obviously not as rigid and not as determinant and not as detailed as how
they obviously make references to Russia which is obviously on on both EU and and
NATO's doorsteps so in in in in in conclusion I just want to raise couple
of points something I refer to you uh early in my
presentation again I I showed this slide to you the only reference I want to make here is
uh the reference to the in the Pacific was listed as 0.85
out of 90. in in NATO's declaration it may be just the way how the document
came together this communicate came together or indeed it may show uh how the in the Pacific seats on on on
the list of priorities for the uh for foreign if you need to find a direct reference
today in the Pacific almost at the very end of the document well maybe this is something that also helps to understand
you know what what is the current real state of play when it comes to
addressing the concerns that as I said the Europeans were sharing and expressing and and genuinely concerned
with for for many years uh not something that just came up only only now
and to support this argument um uh I just want to leave you with uh
um with with this with this reference of someone who is pretty senior in in in
European Defense bureaucracy but someone who will not be regarded as tier one person so quite often what is said or
stated by heads of state or or the ministers is is is an official line
which may be very optimistic very promising Etc but quite often the
reality or the real kind of language need to be sought by someone who belongs to the so-called tier two uh diplomacy
um Christoph hesgen is is certainly one of those key leaders of Europe's tier 2
security and diplomatic apparatus he is in charge of Europe's equivalent of the
Shangri-La dialogue the Munich security conference so he is very much in the know of what is going on behind closed
doors so when Kevin made the reference in Tokyo uh about that yes NATO will say
all all the right things Etc but doesn't really have the capacity to
address by actual means whatever may be happening in our part of the world it might also be the reflection of the
current state of affairs I don't want to create an impression that this is going to be status quo I'm pretty sure Europe
will rise up to uh to to the challenges in the in the Pacific and I certainly
would would encourage you to do it sooner than later uh but I think that
the war in Ukraine exposed some serious limitations to to Europe's capacity to address these concerns something that
was actually an Open Secret in Afghanistan I remember conversations on on supporting the commitment in
Afghanistan when NATO scrambled to assign an additional Battalion which is
a military unit of some three to five hundredths of 500 Personnel when an
organization of a 1032 States says we'll probably find tough you know
committing additional 400 Personnel to to support an operations that in itself
kind of indicated that there were problems the war in Ukraine exposed even greater problems in terms of responding
to what conventional type um uh security threats so if China will
decide to follow Russia's suit or if North Korea decides it had a really big
money and Awakening and do something really nasty well how far Europe will go
that's a big question and I want to finally finish leave you with where we
all fit here in Australia for a long time uh Australia has been very proud in
in in in in developing and expanding its security and defense the defense ties with certainly NATO and uh more recently
with with the EU we always regard ourselves as a very having special
relationship uh with uh with Brussels again you know Brussels wearing two hats
here but it was very interesting to see how Australia was was perceived at this
Summit in in Vilnius and in this sense I want to compare in to another part of
the ip4 remarks by a native Secretary General Store stontelberg I think kind
of you know summarizes all so I'll leave it here thank you very
much for your attention I probably went overboard with my short remarks but happy to take any questions
thank you very much questions please
I'd like to just introduce yourself
[Music] so just use the microphone just need to just push the button at the
bottom yeah there we go what gets bandied around a lot is this article five
right and the idea that people have different interpretations of
what that means to enact Article 5 of the NATO and so I can see where the
Europeans would be very concerned about having a nato-like relationship here in Asia with that
article five because they don't want to turn into World War one where all those alliances caused all that other you know
after action stuff so can you go into an explanation of what article 5 actually
says it's what it's supposed to do because frankly what's going on in Ukraine right
now that's Article Five the way I kind of understand it right and my time in
Ukraine um I you know I talked to them a lot about different things like this because
their interpretation of what they believe the Americans were going to do and what they I you know I told him
there it's a foolish thing to believe that the Americans were gonna drop troops in there right they all believe that's why they had confidence but so
Article Five let's go back to that article five what is it what does it really commit
thank you that's that's a really important question uh Article 5 uh
reflects on um NATO's traditional model
that uh in in in in in really simple summary Article 5 says an attack on one is an
attack on all so musketeer principle you know you know all for one one for all uh
meaning that if one of the NATO member states was attacked by third party the
organization would consider it to be an attack on the entire organization [Music]
um of all the history of NATO it was only activated once after 9 11. because NATO considered an
attack on the United States as an attack on the alliance and as a result we saw NATO's involvement in Afghanistan
question of um using Article 5
or the difficulty of of using Article 5 is based on two premises one is
Article 5 can only be exercised within the jurisdiction of the alliance
meaning if we're talking about Ukraine well it's not part of the alliance it
may be a very close partner and certainly now Ukraine is now more integrated in NATO structures than it
was before The Invasion so if Putin in his mind was thinking well we need to deny Ukraine or deny native to Ukraine
well he has actually created an opposite effect um
uh so in this sense using Article 5 in the context of being the Pacific unless
we're talking about specific territories like you know French islands for example
or Diego Garcia controlled by the uh and which was on the jurisdiction of
the UK then NATO may be kind of be entertaining
the idea whether Article 5 can be activated or not uh but again
NATO's strategy and NATO's strategic philosophy is still very much driven in cheetah but the Atlantic transatlantic
approach it's about Europe's defense um Collective defense and it's about
this strategic linchpin that brings NATO brings the United States
into Europe to quote Madeleine Albright um but there is also another thing
many assume that activation of Article 5 immediately translates into action now
once Article 5 is activated that means that bureaucracies starts having consultations okay we activate Article
Five what our next steps are going to be so activation of Article 5 even if one
of NATO members would come under the attack doesn't mean that tomorrow NATO will move in force and will repel that
that attempt there would still be waiting different scenarios they will be playing uh different work fighting
scenarios and contemplate the response and that became part of the discussion
also in the context of Ukraine um when the idea of for example Ukraine
will now get tactical aircraft uh but way to base it if they would be
moved to Ukraine they may be bombed but if they will start a parade from airfields of Romania or Poland
whether that would be kazu's belly for the Russians and if so if the Russians will bomb Targets in in
Romanian Poland on the grounds that are when we're not really attacking you guys we only are taking assets that attack Us
in Ukraine whether that would lead to activation of particle 5 Etc because
obviously um uh I I think it also depends on the
contingency you know when you deal with countries like Libya for example then I
think NATO would feel more relaxed when you when you know that article 5 activation is linked to
an open confrontation with the nuclear arms State I think there is going to be a lot of thinking going Beyond before
that so even even now in the context of this debate where the Ukraine should have
been invited into NATO at Wellness where the Ukraine should be invited part by
part into illness as some proposed like you know uh territories or provinces or
regions of Ukraine which are currently controlled by the Ukrainian authorities could kind of become part of the
alliance jurisdiction and I think the fact that it was the idea was was
rejected I think is a reflection that there is a bit of a fear
that if you go down the the the
worst scenario Playbook and you start entertain an article five it would create
you know possibilities that perhaps some of its neighbors don't want to really
see so it's it's it's it's it's almost like it's almost like it's a form of
insurance but it's such an expensive insurance and it comes with like you know such a
massive liability that when you want to launch the claim you'll be thinking twice whether it's
actually worth Lodge in the claim or whether you want to absorb the damage and paid on its own so it's it's a very
interesting way how uh this this whole idea of of benefits
of being being part of NATO because you kind of come under this article five protection uh is entertained in times of
real crisis so I I think that that in itself creates a lot of uh perceptions
and and and uh and more importantly misperceptions and adds to this confusion of whether it's actually
something that can work to the benefit or it's something that yeah we've got this in our pocket
but we better not use it so I don't know if I answered your question because I don't have a silver
bullet answer no there is a Super Bowl I'm just I was just highlighting how confusing it
is yeah and how especially people along the east rim of NATO use this as a credible when they
really don't know what the people further to the West aren't so certain that that's what's going to happen
the the challenge uh for um relatively new members of NATO
as you refer to them as East Spring perhaps with an exception of Poland is yes they they tend to kind of take a
very categorical tone or a doctor very categorical autonomy um saying things
and calling on correction but I think they give down understand when it comes to the actual doing actual
fighting it's not them who is going to do it because they don't have the capacity right it's the Americans who will have to
bring the bulk of the weight followed by perhaps the French the Turks the brakes and and everyone else
so and I think the ones that know if if it would come to that it will be us and
our people will then have to implement that article five that can of course is
reflected in different approaches so in in when you said it it's really
the bureaucracy that's what I'm referring to we're already doing Article Five in Ukraine it's the bureaucracy of
now we're supplying all the weapons and that so that activity has already begun
because you know just being attacked by one means attack and all doesn't mean you're putting troops there right some
of the smaller states are not going to put troops on the ground right well well in in the I I would agree with you but I
would also kind of not disagree with you but I would probably uh change it
slightly I think it's a is I mean you're absolutely right you know it's the bureaucracy that effectively creates
these de facto support of Ukraine as if Ukraine is part of native
but I would actually argue it's it's it's an attempt to avoid going down the path of Article Five so
that's the price it's all it's almost like as I was saying you know uh if you look at the Article Five
there's an expensive insurance and you had an intrusion and you want to think okay do I need to make a claim with all
the fees that I would pay or do I simply fix the damage myself sorry to me this is what Europe is doing right now it's
it's paying the bill without going to the insurance because the insurance may actually be
too costly and it's cheaper for them to do it that way it's not just the Europeans it's the Americans too Remy
thank you for this comprehensive exploration Alex my question is in addition to that let's go let's keep
going we're in Article Five here um it seems to me that it is it was attractive to small countries like
Estonia and Lithuania Etc um is it attractive enough now for these
four leaders of indo-pacific so do we see these scenario as the first step for
Australia now and New Zealand and you know others to join NATO what is your
take on that well I don't think we would be talking about them joining NATO uh
uh because if if NADA is is to accommodate ip4 or even one or two
members of the ip4 it it won't be NATO it has to be it has to be it has to be
become something else which was actually reflected by remarks
by uh the French President Manuel macron who
opposed very strongly to the idea of uh NATO opinion office in Tokyo
he made a reference simply say NATO is about not Atlantic pretty
organization so foreign to to
have a proper foothold including through membership in the in the Pacific it
needs to effectively kill itself and rethink reimagine and be reborn in a
completely different entity in terms of Article 5 well look NATO is a nuclear armed
Alliance and coming coming back to your point you know Article Five in in theory brings nuclear umbrella into the
equation but if you look at the security and defense relationships involving the ip4
New Zealand Australia Japan Republic of Korea they have nuclear Umbrella by
having bilateral security agreements with the United States uh
there are security relationships that exist between these two these four
member states that support one one another so we have defense relationships
with all of them um uh
uh so in in this sense um become informally part of NATO doesn't
necessarily mean that somehow Australian security or Japan Security will be greatly enhanced
um it may be the question that we may have to you know pick up the bill first of all we need to remember that
a a member of NATO has to spend a certain amount of GDP on
defense the average figure I think is about 2.6 percent
something like that NATO was understanding uh uh for a very long time
and now they're paying the price for that so that means uh if we hypothetically talk about
um some sort of membership then we need to talk about increasing our defense budgets
in the case of Japan well I I think for the work the the the the
Republic of Korea I I think I would probably say nato would benefit more
from them then the other way simply because they have very important Defense Forces they
have really potent defense industry Etc um so they can actually bring more to
the table that they need to can uh in in in a sense um so in in terms of in terms of actual
benefits well look as I said you know having declaratory statements is one thing
but if at the end of the day the the the the ip4 will be left to be alone
in the in the Pacific in terms of real crisis because the Europeans may be saying yeah we can send you a couple of
frigates and you know the whole three aircraft because the rest are committed to you
know um [Music] balancing against the Russians and and elsewhere
I don't I don't think it's going to kind of be really um very interesting so I think uh
uh and and and you know the the level of current relationships that we have
uh and by way I mean the the four and the in the Pacific four has with NATO
doesn't stop for example information sharing doesn't stop the the exchange of Technology Etc
um and um and on the other hand I'm not really sure whether for example Republic
of Korea or Japan or I live alone New Zealand would be willing
to sign a defense relationship with NATO because inevitably that would transform
the way how the Chinese will look at them the Chinese are not looking at them right now very happily
but it's still conditional so Japan is still perceives itself as apparate and
self-defense Force even now the transition the the self-defense force and the proper military and changing
their constitution RK is still viewed in the context of its
relationship with uh with the United States but also you know grumpy North Korea Etc
I don't think New Zealand would probably want to go any path uh of uh you know
I mean they have answers they're part of answers so
again you know when you when you when you when you scratch the surface and start going into fine detail and as you
know the devil is always in detail um how much of it uh of a real benefit
such such a potential kind of expanded
Alliance would bring to the table is a big question about this but before we
can talk about benefit the first thing that needs to happen is Nathan needs to
be native needs to be no more and something else needs to be to be
it's not as easy because it requires a change of strategic philosophy
you know the the the mentality the thinking the planning
you know uh I I can certainly say you know when it comes to drafting warplanes
etc etc that that's that's a massive that's a massive undertaking that require a massive shift I'm sure they
would probably have some contingency plans for the in the Pacific but not in the context of the whole organization
involvement and I grew up later five eyes Network serves Australia's interests much more
effectively than membership of NATO however NATO would be a distraction Firebase is much more focused and much
more much more targeted around our own interests but also the final Point uh is
every action triggers a counter reaction if we would see the the kind of
the the emergence of okay let's use this uh public term you know Asian version of
NATO here we should be expecting a some sort of an
emergency of a County coalition um to to to to respond to it because our
AP arrivals are not going to cheat and wait to see some sort of a you know we need to see we we we still dealing with
the Fallout from the announcement of the Oaks agreement which also kind of brings uh to to Nato
Members Plus Australian to into into into one Alliance so uh that that uh and
and again the Fallout from that and I'm sure potential consequences I've been
calculated in in Brussels as well as in Washington may actually outweigh the
benefits I'm conscious of time but we've got Marin Tom from one or two more questions
I'll try look um I or I lived in Europe until the mid
90s at NATO always struck me as more symbolic than anything else so now I'm
wondering has history overtaken NATO do we actually need something different
look I mean that was the the major point of debate in in the 90s and even early
2000s as I said you know with the with the disillusionment of the worser pact
and the collapse of the Soviet Union NATO's NATO's mission came to an end there was nothing and no
one to balance against um and yeah questions were raised with because NATO is a very expensive
bureaucracy apart from everything else um whether it was worth keeping this
organization or whether European security should become part of the OAC mandate and something else should come
into place again and maybe something saying
something really kind of you know uh horrific but NATO should really erect
the monument to Putin in in his headquarters because Putin gave NATO a
new life now there is no kind of need for NATO to imagine why it needs to be in Europe why
it needs to stay in Europe and why it needs to continue to exist and and and expand
um with regards to the in the Pacific again
that's that's that's a different story um
but again you know NATO now it's not NATO the way how I
remember it in in the in the Cold War it's it's it's going through the period
of of rebuilding itself it lost a lot of capability and the fact that it's got
bigger and bigger doesn't didn't mean that it got stronger and stronger so uh it's it's still in the point of
transition but I think it landed back in its comfort zone if not if not for Ukraine I think
questions would still be raised because even though it was in search of its identity and tried itself in Afghanistan
foreign Etc it wasn't as clearly straightforward as
it is now because now it's back to the old Cold War play book and everything is very clear and everyone feels
comfortable and there is no more pretense about what Nate's thinking was about before that
I don't know if that answered your question or not yes please
uh just wondering given Russia's sort of unique Geo geographical locations sort
of like having access to both Europe and the Pacific and given that how like sometime last year they had some
territorial dispute with Japan over Japan's northern islands which is you know dispute that kind of goes back
since World War II how my Russia's sort of Pacific
Ambitions or like Ambitions in the area might pose a threat to something to like
uh the general Regional security and how am I to compare to something like the situation in the South China Sea of
Taiwan uh look I mean how much time do we have you've got
three minutes okay uh well first of all Russia doesn't just have territorial disputes with Japan and also has
territorial disputes with the United States because the only area where Russia and and the United States Shades
common boundaries and bearing stride in in in in Northern Pacific
um I I think because I've been I've been researching Russia in particular Russia's strategic engagement in the in
the Pacific for a very long time I can certainly say there is still significant and appreciation of what the Russians
are doing in our part of the world because with the collapse of the Soviet Union with the removal of uh Russia's
forward presence in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia we kind of expect assume that the Russians are no longer
part of the in the Pacific equation even if you look at Australia's dectrinal documents until 1992 Russia always
featured on our assessments after 1992 just gone so we know never look to what
I just say to the north of the Great Wall of China we kind of think that Asia Pacific stops there you know
nothing else um the Russians now more active in the in the Pacific because Europe has been
closed for them for good and even though before they were always saying to headed eagle looking West
looking East you know the in the Pacific they don't use determine the Pacific they still refer to it as the Asia
Pacific the Asia Pacific is still important to us but they still very much focused on Europe and on the United
States now they're coming into into Asia not because they finally grow grow up
and and realized yes they also part of the Pacific Community but because they don't have much of a choice
but they don't come here and I don't think they have been viewed here even after the invasion of Ukraine as as
someone as a threat I think the well before the invasion of Ukraine the Russians were positioning themselves
simply saying look before us coming back to you guys you had the choice either choose Washington
or choose Beijing now we bring ourselves to you as the third Force some of you
had dealings with us when we were the Soviet Union or the Imperial Russia before that others may be discovering us
without ideological and opinion uh I'm not really sure how they're
positioning themselves now uh but I certainly can can say and I
attended a number of virtual meetings when the Americans and others are trying to
figure out what Russia's relationships with key uh asia-pacific uh partners are
and I can certainly say even now there is more sympathy to what Russia is doing in Ukraine
uh Beyond Australia well Japan is an exception maybe our ROK is an exception
then to Ukraine being the victim so does it help the Russians
um to some extent yes perhaps not been viewed as a countable anymore but as as
someone who that invested quite a bit of time but having said all of that uh there is
one thing I know you wanted to ask me a question about precaution uh
um so I'll just bring it into the equation School
I I think there was a pretty straightforward case that those who
develop pretty good relationships with Moscow and with understanding that Putin is in the
Kremlin forever felt very comfortable but this whole confusion about preggersian school
um I think May raise some questions about how sustainable the political uh
political power of the Kremlin is right now that made it may actually be moment
damage into Russia's relations with the in the Pacific than anything else including the war in Ukraine
but again I I think we should realize that the Russians are really really
active and and and and the way how we perceive Russia is fundamentally
different to the way how the region faces Russia uh so this is something that we we need
to appreciate including in the context of SEO the Shanghai cooperation organization where Russia continues to
play one of the leading roles plus bricks I've got one last question for you
I hinted at this earlier given Ben Wallace the UK defense Minister's recent comment should rate Ukraine be more
grateful than they are for the support they're getting oh I think so uh I look I mean I think Tucson to to some extent
Ukraine's president valedimir zielinsky kind of really overplayed uh his role of
representative of of his country look I mean I understand where he's coming from and I understand that he is under
enormous pressure and and and stress but for for quite some time the the response
that ukrainians had was uh yeah we thank you for what you received but we still don't like it or it is not enough or not
good enough and um look I I think partially
uh uh partially Ukraine's Western partners
can take blame for that because they created such an impression that Ukraine is now going to be formally embraced and
it will be part of us Etc so yeah you kind of take it take it for granted and you want
you kind of believe because if you if you read the way how everything was said in Ukraine over
the past 12 months yes you can start assuming saying well why aren't you inviting us into NATO why don't you you
know you you're talking about loving us to beats well why don't we enter formal you know marriage you know instead of
being de facto you know aren't we aren't we ready to kind of take the next step
and and I think that was part of almost like uh given the ukrainians a signal
like you know don't push it you know we we will be working with you but don't really make it that you know we owe you
something here uh even the ukrainians actually genuinely feel that way because
uh and angelinsky makes it very clear at every every point in time that coming
back to the to your question on how well my response to your question on how NATO buys itself out of activate an article
five well the Ukraine effectively you know tried to buy hit itself in into European
structures by by paying the ultimate price thousands of people die every day so
that's where I mean you understand where I can understand where zelensky is coming from but it's also you know
it's also a situation and I think Ukraine needs to realize that of the past 12 months it achieves such a
massive shift now it's entirely dependent totally dependent unconditionally dependent on the ongoing
Western military aid without which it cannot carry on with the war so in this
sense yes uh uh you know you you talk to the donor
understanding that they're your donor they don't owe you anything you owe them
even though it's a again you can also develop a narrative simply
saying that NATO owes Ukraine because it saves Ukraine it saves it from you know
inviting and and committing and then talking about Article Five
terrific thank you so much Alexia yet again uh your knowledge uh your frankness in in
dealing both with the the core material and and certainly the questions is very much appreciated I've certainly learned
a lot in this last uh hour or so and I think all of us here have so thanks so much for joining us and we look forward
to uh welcoming you back more regularly than we've been able to
thanks as Alexi said to my colleague Irene for all her work getting this to happen
look forward to seeing you at our next seminar which I'm not sure what that will be but sometime within the next
month thank you very much indeed there has been comments for that
